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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, & 
Logistics) 
 Director, Acquisition Career Management, ASN (RD&A) 
 Program Executive Officer, SHIPS 
 Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
 Program Executive Officer, Integrated Warfare Systems 
 Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
 Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & 
Technology) 
 Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, U.S. Army 
 Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, 
Department of Energy 
 Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Research, Development, Test, & 
Evaluation 
 Program Executive Officer, Tactical Aircraft  
 Director, Office of Small Business Programs, Department of the Navy 
 Director, Office of Acquisition Resources and Analysis (ARA) 
 Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Acquisition & Procurement 
 Director of Open Architecture, DASN (RDT&E) 
 Program Executive Officer, Littoral Combat Ships 
James B. Greene Jr. Keith F. Snider, PhD 
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.) Associate Professor 
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Addressing Counterfeit Parts in the DoD Supply Chain1 
Jacques S. Gansler—The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler, former Under Secretary of Defense for 
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, is a professor and holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public 
Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland; he is also the 
director of the Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise. As the third-ranking civilian at the 
Pentagon from 1997–2001, Dr. Gansler was responsible for all research and development, 
acquisition reform, logistics, advance technology, environmental security, defense industry, and 
numerous other security programs. Before joining the Clinton Administration, Dr. Gansler held a 
variety of positions in government and the private sector, including Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Material Acquisition), Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering 
(Electronics), senior vice president at TASC, vice president of ITT, and engineering and management 
positions with Singer and Raytheon Corporations. 
Throughout his career, Dr. Gansler has written, published, testified, and taught on subjects 
related to his work.  He is the author of five books and over 100 articles. His most recent book is 
Democracy’s Arsenal: Creating a 21st Century Defense Industry (MIT Press, 2011).  
In 2007, Dr. Gansler served as the chair of the Secretary of the Army’s Commission on 
Contracting and Program Management for Army Expeditionary Forces. He is a member of the 
Defense Science Board and the Government Accountability Office Advisory Board. He is also a 
member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the National Academy of Public 
Administration. Additionally, he is the Glenn L. Martin Institute Fellow of Engineering at the A. James 
Clarke School of Engineering; an affiliate faculty member at the Robert H. Smith School of Business; 
and a senior fellow at the James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership (all at the University of 
Maryland). From 2003–2004, Dr. Gansler served as interim dean of the School of Public Policy at the 
University of Maryland, and from 2004–2006, he served as Vice President for Research at the 
University of Maryland. [jgansler@umd.edu] 
William Lucyshyn—Mr. Lucyshyn is the Director of Research and a senior research scholar at the 
Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise in the School of Public Policy at the University of 
Maryland. Previously, Mr. Lucyshyn served as a program manager and the Principal Technical 
Advisor to the Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) on the 
identification, selection, research, development, and prototype production of advanced technology 
projects. Prior to joining DARPA, Mr. Lucyshyn completed a 25-year career in the U.S. Air Force. Mr. 
Lucyshyn received his bachelor’s degree in engineering science from the City University of New York 
and earned his master’s degree in nuclear engineering from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He 
has authored numerous reports, book chapters, and journal articles. [lucyshyn@umd.edu] 
John Rigilano—Rigilano is a faculty research assistant at the Center for Public Policy and Private 
Enterprise. He earned his Master of Public Policy degree from the University of Maryland, College 
Park, in 2011 and holds a Bachelor of Arts degree in anthropology from the Pennsylvania State 
University. He is pursuing a career in policy and program analysis. [jprig@umd.edu] 
Introduction 
In June 2007, the U.S. Department of the Navy, Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR), asked the Bureau of Industry and Security’s (BIS) Office of Technology 
Evaluation (OTE) to conduct a defense industrial base assessment of counterfeit 
electronics. NAVAIR suspected that an increasing number of counterfeit/defective 
electronics was infiltrating the DoD supply chain and affecting weapon system reliability. 
OTE data revealed that 39% of companies and organizations participating in the survey 
encountered counterfeit electronics during the four-year study period. Moreover, the 
                                                
1 This is a summary of the full report, which will be available in July 2013. 
 ^Åèìáëáíáçå=oÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ãW=
`êÉ~íáåÖ=póåÉêÖó=Ñçê=fåÑçêãÉÇ=ÅÜ~åÖÉ= -=523 - 
=
frequency of detected counterfeit incidents was escalating rapidly, rising from 3,868 
incidents in 2005 to 9,356 incidents in 2008. These counterfeit incidents included multiple 
versions of DoD qualified parts and components (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2010).  
Today, the DoD procures systems and products from a large network of global 
suppliers and manages over four million different parts at a cost of over $94 billion (GAO, 
2010). As the DoD draws from this increasingly global supplier base, its visibility into these 
source companies is often limited; quality controls are, at times, insufficient; and chain of 
custody verification is lacking. As a result, the challenge of assuring the integrity and 
provenance of parts and components has grown geometrically more complex in this global 
sourcing environment.  
When they are installed in systems, counterfeit parts and components can affect the 
safety, operational readiness, cost, and critical nature of the military mission. Almost any 
part can be counterfeited—including fasteners used on aircraft, electronics used on missile 
guidance systems, and materials used in body armor and engine mounts. Counterfeit parts 
have the potential to cause a serious disruption to DoD supply chains, delay ongoing 
missions, and even affect the integrity of weapons systems (GAO, 2010). 
Additionally, as DoD weapon systems age, products required to support them may 
no longer be available from the original manufacturers or through franchised or authorized 
suppliers. Instead, the DoD must turn to independent distributors, brokers, or aftermarket 
manufacturers as sources of supply. Here again, the DoD is at risk for acquiring counterfeit 
parts. 
At the same time, counterfeiters continue to develop more sophisticated capabilities, 
making detection all the more difficult. For instance, third-party subcontractors for major 
defense companies have been found to manufacture working components, only to mix them 
with cheaper parts of inferior quality and/or non-working components. Needless to say, 
schemes of this sort make determining the provenance of counterfeit components 
exceedingly difficult. 
Over the years, counterfeiters have also fine-tuned their ability to replicate parts, 
often by relying on scrap materials that were thought to have been destroyed (Martin, 2012). 
The burgeoning practice of harvesting and, often, repurposing electronic waste or “e-waste” 
(e.g., discarded computers, office electronic equipment, entertainment device electronics, 
mobile phones, telephones, and refrigerators) poses a growing challenge to the DoD. In the 
slums of China, India, and Pakistan, peasants “cook” circuit boards over trash can fires in 
order to remove the metal chips, selling them to local counterfeiting operations. Once the 
chips are cleaned, refurbished, and relabeled, they are purchased by unscrupulous military 
subcontractors that go on to supply “military grade” microchips to many of America’s largest 
defense companies. According to a 2012 GAO report, some of these microchips are then 
used in some of the DoD’s major weapons systems.  
In this environment, the DoD must step up its war against counterfeit parts, much as 
private industry has done. For example, counterfeit drugs are rare (at least in the United 
States) thanks to the relatively high level of safety assuredness for U.S. pharmaceuticals 
(Lechleiter, 2012). This includes the review of production yields, capacity, and/or product 
amounts compared with raw material purchases. Given the relative ease with which 
authentic-looking drugs can be reproduced (indeed, reproducing packaging is more 
expensive than making the fake drug), it is remarkable that there are so few reported 
instances of counterfeits. 
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Across the DoD supply chain, however, counterfeits of all types—from electronic 
equipment to metal fasteners—have been found. As a direct consequence, the lives of 
military men and women are at stake. Thus far, the impact of counterfeit parts has been 
minimal in this regard. According to Pentagon Press Secretary, George Little, “[the DoD] is 
unaware to date of any loss of life or catastrophic mission failure that has occurred because 
of counterfeit parts” (Garamone, 2012, p. 1). But given the growth of the availability of 
counterfeit parts, it may only be a matter of time.  
All branches of the Services are affected by the threat of counterfeit parts. The 
following examples illustrate cases in which counterfeit parts have infiltrated the Services’ 
supply chains (GAO, 2010). 
 Army: Seatbelt clasps. Seatbelt parts were made from a grade of aluminum 
that was inferior to that specified in the DoD’s requirements. The parts were 
found to be deficient when the seatbelts were accidentally dropped and they 
broke.  
 Navy: Routers. The Navy, as well as other DoD and government agencies, 
purchased counterfeit network components—including routers—that had high 
failure rates and the potential to shut down entire networks. A two-year FBI 
criminal investigation led to 10 convictions and $1.7 million in restitution.  
 Air Force: Microprocessor. The Air Force needed microprocessors that 
were no longer produced by the original manufacturer for its F-15 flight-
control computer. These microprocessors were procured from a broker, and 
F-15 technicians noticed additional markings on the microprocessor and 
character spacing inconsistent with the original part. A total of four counterfeit 
microprocessors were found and as a result were not installed on the F-15’s 
operational flight control computers. 
 Defense Logistics Agency: Packaging and small parts. During a two-year 
period, a supplier and three co-conspirators packaged hundreds of 
commercial items from hardware and consumer electronics stores and 
labeled them as military-grade items. For example, a supplier labeled the 
package containing a circuit from a personal computer as a $7,000 circuit for 
a missile guidance system. The suppliers avoided detection by labeling 
packages to appear authentic, even though they contained the wrong part. 
The supplier received $3 million from contracts totaling $8 million before 
fleeing the country.  
Defense contractors are encouraged to report counterfeits using the Government 
Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP) database. GIDEP serves as a data repository for 
the collection and sharing information on nonconforming parts and materials, including 
information on suspect counterfeit products, allowing government and industry participants 
to share information. However, not all participants are willing to share such information. This 
is not surprising given the lack of clear incentives, especially if the participating firm believes 
their reputation may be damaged as a result. 
In order to reduce the risk of counterfeit parts in the DoD supply chain, we provide 
the following high-level recommendations: 
 Partner with industry to develop a network of trusted providers. 
 Mandate that suppliers report suspect counterfeits using GIDEP and provide 
penalties for non-compliance. 
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 Require that the supplier absorb any costs associated with the removal and 
replacement of counterfeit parts or components that make their way into DoD 
systems. 
 Invest in visibility systems to track the provenance and transport of parts and 
components. 
 Adopt regionalized supply chains to reduce supplier and transport risk. 
The threat of counterfeit parts within the DoD’s supply chain is real and will only 
escalate over time, with potentially serious consequences. In order to reduce this threat, the 
DoD and its industry partners will have to work together. While both may have the best 
intentions, it is essential that incentives, penalties, and rewards are properly aligned in order 
to produce the desired outcome.  
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